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Defendant and Appellant
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FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE AND TRUST COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from Summary Judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah,
Honorable A. H. Ellett, presiding.
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and Joseph J. Palmer
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Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for AppeUant
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and Harry D. Pugsley
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.....
Salt Lake City, Utah
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and Delbert M. Draper, Jr.
600 El Paso Natural Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent

i

1

~
~

,,

,

.....,.

.

',

'

'

".

T"•
I.'

n

L

TABLE OF

CO~TEXTS

Page
T. REPLY rro RESPONDENT PRUDEN-

rrlAL'S BRIEF ___________________ ------------------------------------- 1

11.

Rl~PL Y

TO

RESPONDENT

FIRS T

AMERICAN'S BRIEF __________ ----------------------------------- 7
CON CL lTSION --------------------------------------------------------------11

CASES CITED
Blue Anchor Overall Co., Inc. 1'. Prnnsylvania
Luitnbennan's Mutual Ins. Co., (Pa., 195G),

123 A.2d 413, 59 ALR 2d 54G ----------------------------·····-·· 7
United States Guarnmty Co. v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co. (Wisc., 1943), 12 N.W.2d 59, 150

ALR 632 ... _.... _____ .. __ .. _,,_ .. ___ ,, .... _...... _....... _.......... _............. 8
STATUTE CITED

78-33-11, U .G.A. 1953 ...... _............ -........................................ 3

In the Supreme O.ourl of the Stale of Utah
PHlTDl~NTIAL

FEDERAL SAVINGS

& LOAN ASSOCIATION,

a torporation,

Plaintiff and Rrspondent,
VS.

TH1£ ST. PAUL INSURANCE
('.()~f P ANIES,
Def cndant and Apvellant

Case No.
10765

and
FIRS'l' Al\IERICAN TITLI~ INSURA0.' CE AND TRFST COMPANY,
Def cndant and Respondrnt.

APPELLANT'S REPILY BRIEF

I. REPLY TO RESPONDENT PRUDENTIAL
FI£DERAL'S BRIEF
RPspondent Prudential's statement of facts and the
argunwnt throughout the brief, refer to appellant's bond
as a "fidelity bond." This is grossly inaccurate, for the
honJ is a ''Savings, Building and Loan Association
Blankd Bond with ExtendPd Coverages (R-104)," with
lllany ron•rages including fidelity.

This is important,

for as shO\rn in appellant's brief, point II, pages 16 and

17, lilankd policiPs only supplernt>nt specific insurance
and arv Pxress to s1wcific insurance.
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Respondent Prudential's brief, in its statement of
facts, page 2, says "No dispute exists ... that the said
fidelity bond was before the court though not introduced
actually in evidence by stipulation until after the order
was made by the court." Dispute certainly does exist,
for the record is clear appellant's bond was not before
the Trial Court when it entered its summary judgment.
As pointed out in appellant's brief, page 12, it ·was not
offered in evidence until three months after the summary judgment was entered. ·without a11pellant's bond
before it, the trial court could not haw construed appellant's bond and determined its liability thereon.
Respondent Prudential's brief, page 3, irnplieos appellant asserts as its sole defense the "other insurance"
provisions of its policy. Appellant has ahva>-s and continues to assert additionally that plaintiff has suffered
no loss. See appellant's brief, point I.
Respondent Prudential's brief, page 5, notes no
cross-claim was filed by appellant against respondent
First American, and says "hence, the court was bound
to make a determination predicated upon the Complaint
itself ... ". Of course no cross-claim was filed agaiHst
First American because appf'llant St. Paul does not
claim and cannot claim respondent First Am<>rican i'
liable to it. As shown by appellant's brit>f, page -ti.
plaintiff deliberately stated no claim against tlir• ti!k
insurer, for the simple reason that the title insun'r·,
agents' counsel is no\v appearing for lilai11tiff (R-78, ?))
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Appellant alleged in its answer, paragraph 8, "that First
American Title Insurance Company, not defendant, is
liable to plaintiff (R-5 ). " There can be no doubt that
respondent First American has an interest in the declaratory judgment, as required by Section 78-33-11, U.C.A.
1953, ·which provides:
"When declaratory relief is sought, all pershall be made parties who have or claim any
interest which may be affected by the decelaration .... " (Emphasis added)

so1ls

This section is not discretionary; it says, in effect, First
American "shall" be made a party. Upon that statute,
the District Court ordered respondent First American
joined as a party defendant. In light of that statute and
appellant's ans\ver, alleging First American, not appellant, is liable to plaintiff, it simply does not follow that
''the Court was bound to make its determination predicated npon the Complaint itself, which was solely for
dedaratory relief as to the interpretation of the language
of the fidelity bond" (Plaintiff's brief, page 5). Indeed,
the rxact contrary is true, and the trial court was bound
to determine whether respondent First American was
liahl<> to plaintiff even though no cross-claim, as such,
\\"as filed against n•spondent Fi.rst American.
HPspondent Prudential's brif'f, page 12, says:
"After evaluating the problem, Prudential
el<>drd to seek a judicial determination and has
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by its complaint alleged its position that appellant St. Paul is liable under the fidelity bon<l.
Prudential does not believe the policy exclusion
gives St. Paul an escape from the clear-cut terms
of the covering, insuring clause."
That simply is contrary to fact. Plaintiff did make
formal demand on Security Title Company, respondent
First American's agent (R-77). Security Title Company
has paid all of the monthly payment owing on the prior
mortgage (R-73, 74). This shows that not only does
Prudential believe appellant is not liable and that respondent First American is, it also shows that the title
company thinks so too. Of coursE>, what the parties
think or believe is immaterial. The question is, who is
liable. The title company in effect admits its liability
by paying the first mortgage. The actions of Prudential
and the title company speak far louder than the abovequoted language by the title company's counsel, now
appearing for plaintiff Prudential.
The whole gist of respondent Prudential's argument
is summed up on pages 12 and 13 of its brief, which says
St. Paul is not excused from liability " ( 1) because th~
policy of title insurance does not cover the type of 108~
or losses indemnified by this bond, and (2) because tlw
title policy may be unenforcable as the title insurer
asserts that it was issued as a n•sult of a mistake of a
material face, and ( 3) was not intended to cover embezzlement risks which St. Paul claims." (numeral~
added). Let us analyze these three ela ims separn t<:' ly.
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First, it begs the issue of whether the title insurer
is liable to say the title policy does not cover the type
of loss covered by the appellant's bond.
Second, the title insurer cannot escape liability even
if the policy was issued as a result of a mistake as to
whether the prior first mortgage had been released, for
the title policy excludes only prior liens "not known to
thP company or not shown by the public records," and
this prior mortgage was sho\Yn by the public record and
was known to the title company. Obviously title policies
would he worthless if the title insurer could avoid liability every time it made a mistah. The title insurer is
paid not to make such mistakes.
rrhird, plaintiff says the title policy was not intended
to cover embezzlement risks. That totally ignores Point
II of appellant's brief, which shows it was not the embez.zlement of which plaintiff complains in its complaint,
hut instead it is the loss of priority of its trust deed.
The title policy was intended to cover the risk of loss
of priority of the trust deed, and St. Paul's blanket bond
was not intended to cover that risk.
Respondent's Prudential's brief, page 17, argues
that where an agent acts fraudently and adversely to
llH' principal, his knowledge is still imputed to the

pri11l'ipal if the agent is the sole representative of the
pri11<'ipal in the transaction. Tlwre is no evidence here
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that Rowley was the sole agent. Further, the reason for
the "sole representative rule" is that when the agent is
the only one who acts for the principal, there is no other
way for the principal to claim except through that agent
and hence, all his kno-wledge, good or bad, is the principal's. The rule has no application here berause Rowley
had nothing at all to do with the issuanre of the titlr
policy. Security Title Company, respondf'nt First American's agent, simply issued it on its own accord when
Security saw the release of the Buffo second rnortgagP
(which it had ovf'rlooked in its prf'liminary title rt>port)
and mistook it for the rf'lf'ase of the first mortgagl' of
First Federal Savings ( R-9-1, 95). PrndPntial can daim
and has claimed against thP title company without
relying on any acts of Rowle~v, and tlw title rornpany
has recognized that elaim h!:'rf'. Moreover, pursuant to
the authorities cited in app<•llant's brief, pagf's +1 anJ
42, Security Title knew or was bound to know Rowle~
was acting adversely to Prudential and was exceeding
his authority. It therc>fore had sufficit>nt warning of
lack of authorization, precluding it from imputing
Rowley's knowledge and Rowley's aets to plaintiff.
Plaintiff's brief, page 18, argues that Rowlry':-:
embezzlement occurred before tlw title poliey was issueJ
and therefore appellant's policy rowrcd the defalcation.
As pointed out in page 39 of ap1wllant 's briPf, tlw
measuring time for determining wlii<'h irnrnr0r is liabl 1•
is when the loss was discon'l't>d, Hot "·lH'n it oe<·nn('ll.

7
for appellant's bond (R-10-±) provides coverage against
losses which "shall happen at any time but which are
discovPred by the insured subsequent to noon of the date
hereof." No liability occurs under appellant's bond until
the loss is discovered. Discovery was made after the
title policy was issued.
The only authority cited by respondent Prudential
Federal's brief, at page 13 thereof, supporting its "same
risk" argument, an• a few encyclopedia citations which
have already been distinguished in appellant's brief at
pag-e :12.

TT. REPLY TO RESPONDENT FIRST
Al\fERTCAN'S BRIEF
R0spondent First American bases its sole argument
on the proposition that "there is 'other insurance' only
wlwn~ the insured und0rtakes to insure the same thing
twice against the same perils." It cites only t"·o cases,
and neitlwr is appropriate>.
'T'he brief, page 8, cites Blu(' Aurhor Overall Co., Inc.
I'. Pennsylvania Lumberman's lllutual Ins. Co. (Pa.,
105G) 123 A.2d -±13, 59 A.L.R. 2d 5-±G for the proposition
that there is other insurance only when the two policies
r·o\'<•r the same risk. There, the cause of the insured's
loss \\·as leakage from fire protective equipment. Def1·n<lant 's poliey roven•d loss from fire and loss from
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fire leakage equipment and other policies covered onl,1·
fire loss but not loss from leakage of fire protective
equipment. The court specifically said:
"Since defendant's insurance policy is the
only one which protects from the risk of loss due
to leakage from fire protective equipment, it
would seem clear that plaintiff's other fire insurance policies, being for a different risk, would
not constitute other insurance.''
Here, the loss sustained by plaintiff was the loss of
priority of its mortgage, against which respondent First
American insured. In the Blue Anchor ease, the claimed
"other insurance'' did not even cover the loss actually
sustained. In that case the condition of only dPfendant'~
insurance policy was breached; in this case the condition
of both policies was breached. Obviously, the Blur
Anchor case sheds no light on the problm1 at bar.
Respondent's brief, page 9, cites United States
Guaranty Company v. Liberty Mutual Insiirance Company (Wisc., 1943) 12 N.\V.2d 59, 150 A.L.R. G32, for
the proposition:
"With respect to the claimed doctrine of
'specific and general insurance' the cases all _d_cal
with a general insurer with an Pxpress proV1~1?1~
in his policy that if there is other more 's1wed1c
insurance or other insurance covering t71e S({/111'
risk (emphasis theirs), that thP gt'11pral in:-:nrrr
will be considered only an Pxee:-:s .ms1Her. "
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That case does not support respondent's proposition, and
actually supports appellant's position. There, an employee of a subcontractor of the insured was run into
on the insured's premises by one of the insured's motor
vehicles. The insured had an automobile policy with
plaintiff and a public liability policy with defendant which insured against hazards arising when members of the public came on the insured's premises. Each
policy "provided that if the assured carried a policy
of another insurer against loss and expense covered by
its agreement . . . '' then the policies would be apportioned. Neither policy said anything about there being
"other more 'specific' insurance or other insurance
covering the same risk," as respondent's brief claims.
Instead, the policies each said "if the assured carried a
policy of other insurance against loss and expense coverr,d by this agreement, ... " which is virtually identical
to the language in appellant's policy. Even though one
policy covered motor vehicles and the other covered
puhlic liability, the court there held "the purpose of
each contract was to cover the loss in question," and
required apportionment. It is submitted there is no differmce between an automobile policy and a public liability policy, both covering liability for personal injury,
and a blanket savings and loan bond and a title policy,
both of which cover loss of priority of mortgage. There
th(• anto policy covered autos and the public liability
poliry covered nwrnhPrs of the public; to that extent,
it ronld he said "the risks are different" just as re"] 1011dpnb5 here say one policy covers embezzlements and
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the other covers title insurance. But here, as in the cited
case, "the purpose of each policy was to cover the loss
in question." In the cited cases, the policies were apportioned; here they cannot be apportioned because ap11ellant 's bond is "excess." But the point still exists that
each policy covers the actual loss sustained in both thl'
cited case and the case at bar, and,· therefore, policies
can cover the same risk even though they are different
types of policies.
Respondent First American's brief, page 9, simply
glosses over the whole issue when it says at pages 9
and 10:
"The St. Paul policy does not expressly refer

to other more 'specific' insurance, but of course

it does ref er to other insurance covering the samr
risk (that is, 'other insurance covering any loss,
covered hereunder') (Punctuation theirs).
The St. Paul policy does not say "other indemnity against
any risk, covered hereunder," it says "other loss." Respondents would simply reword appellant's contract for
it, notwithstanding their citation of authority that provisions of insurance contracts are to be construed in
the sense in which they are ordinarily used, and unalllbiguous terms in an insuranct> policy arr to be tak<>n in
their plain, ordinary and popular senst>( brief, pagP S).
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CONCLUSION
Both respondents would ( 1) look only to appellant's
policy and (2) say appellant is not excused because the
title policy is not other indemnity within appellant's
policy because the risks insured are not the same. Point
two is wrong, first because appellant's policy says "if
the insured carries any other indemnity against loss,
hereunder" then its policy is excess. It does not say
"if the insured carries any other fidelity indemnity
against any risk, covered hereunder." Point two is
wrong, ::,;econd, because there is no logical reason to
apply respondent's rule in this instance. Why shouldn't
the title policy be looked to even if the risks insured
in the two policies aren't the same? Point two is wrong,
third, because it is clear that both policies do cover this
loss, as the condition of each policy has been breached.
Fourth, it is wrong because respondents cite absolutely
no authority for their position, other than a few eneyclo1iedia citations taken out of context and not applil'ilhle to the facts here. w·hen the cases themselves are
examined on their facts, it is seen that the cases support
appellant.
However, assertion of point two simply begs the
rral issuc' in this cas<:>. Tlw real issue is which insurer
is liahk', and it is not 'is appellant excused from liability,'
as rPspon<l<,nts "'onld likP. In otlwr words, there is
absoluU•ly no reason why appt>llant's policy must be
lo1ib·d to fir::,;t and s1i1Ply. If the title policy is looked
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to first and liability found, then appellant's bond i~
moot. It is respectfully submitted that the title policy of
respondent First American should be looked to first, because (1) the title company is already paying plaintiff' 8
loss, thereby admitting its liability; (2) the title policy
covers the cause of plaintiff's loss, the loss of priorit>of its mortgage; the title policy is far more casually
connected with the loss plaintiff claims than is appellant''
bond; (3) the title policy is specific in that it covl'rs
only the priority of plaintiff's trust deed, whereas the
blanket savings and loan bond of appellant has man~
coverages and its fidelity coverage is only incidental and
secondary; and (4) appellant's bond expressly says it
is excess. lt must be remembered that First Arneriran
did insure plaintiff's mortgage as a first mortgage, that
it is not a first mortgage, that the title policy has bt'en
breached and that it is entirely fortuitous to respondl'Ht
First American that plaintiff happened to have blanket
coverage which incidentally included fidelity coverage.
Neither respondent saw fit to answer the question
of why the title policy should not be considered. They
seek only to look to appellant's blanket bond. Their
reasoning is obvious; their interests are the same, anrl
this is merely an action by the title company, tlw title
insurer's agent, seeking to 11ass tlte title company''
liability, already assumed through payrnPnt of the
monthly payments on the first mortgage, off to anotlil'l'
by the device of having its lm\7Pr n'pr<>~mt plaintiff
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'The summary judgment in favor of respondents and
the order dismissing respondent First American for failure to state a claim against it should therefore be reyersed, appellant should be awarded its costs on appeal,
and the case should be remanded for determination of
the title insurer's liability.
Respectfully submitted,

SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNO-W

& CHRISTENSEN

701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant

